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Abstract. Whilst conflict is often understood across multiple levels, including its regional 
dimension, peace-building and memory work are rarely put in conversation at this level. The 
paper explores regional dimensions of memory and argues that these open a novel and 
analytically productive lens on the nature and legacy of cross-border conflict and can bolster 
peace-building approaches. Taking the key case study of the Great Lakes Region of Africa, 
and specifically the regionalizing dimensions of the Rwandan genocide, the paper investigates 
the impact of two very different regional dimensions of memory on social cohesion. First, the 
paper considers the more intuitive ways in which grievances that extend across borders and 
fractured regional memories continue to fuel conflict. Second, and pushing beyond this, the 
paper considers the ways in which returning diaspora deploys memory born in the wider 
region in attempts at nation-building. The paper thus deploys a dynamic approach to memory, 
exploring mobile memories and the ways in which regional experiences are carried and 
deployed back in a national context. Overall, the paper urges us to extend regional lens 
beyond the study of conflict roots and operational action to the study of post-conflict peace-
building and commemoration. 
 
Keywords. memory, conflict, transborder imaginaries, regionalism, vicarious remembrance, 
nation building 
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Introduction 
Scholars in political science and international relations have long deployed concepts 
such as ‘regional security complex’i (Buzan and Weaver 2003) or ‘regional conflict 
formations’ii (RCFs) (Rubin 2001 in VanLeeuwen 2008: 395) to analyze complex 
conflicts spanning borders such as that in the Great Lakes of Africa. But we know 
little about the implications of this for memory. Is there a ‘regional memory complex’ 
to match, that is an interacting system of memory operating across the region? And if 
memory is not simply an outcome but ingredient in conflict dynamics, what is the 
nature of the interaction? It was a recent Oxford University workshop that for the first 
time gathered scholars together to explicitly reflect on questions such as this. How do 
we study memory ‘beyond and above national narratives and frameworks’iii? Is one 
possible way of doing this by thinking of ‘regions of memory’ and regional 
dimensions of memory? If so, what is the locus, anatomy and role of such memory in 
an ongoing conflict? And if memory of conflict spans the region, what are then the 
implications for coming to terms with such past in our attempts at resolution— 
through mechanisms such as transitional justice, reconciliation, reconstructions of 
history— which thus far lack this dimension?  
 
In the past decade, the study of conflict and its resolution, especially in cases of 
community-based, localized, even intimate violence characteristic of civil wars, have 
turned from the macro, international and state level to the micro-level, producing 
valuable insights into local drivers, grassroots participation, and the alliances between 
micro and macro actors (see e.g. Kalyvas 2003 & 2006). Similarly, we have witnessed 
a ‘local turn’ in the study of both transitional justice and peace building (see Waldorf 
and Shaw; Autesserre 2012 & 2010 on the latter). This shift of perspective has proven 
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immensely valuable and has certainly not eschewed critique of simplistic notions of 
local ownership, traditionality or hybridity. In this paper, however, I go against the 
grain of studying ‘smaller rather than larger’ and redirect our attention to the 
importance of studying dimensions of memory that reach across borders but are 
simultaneously contained within a defined area of networked space. I look at sharediv 
imaginary and grievance ‘located’ in this manner and the way in which it impacts on 
conflict transformation and peace-building prospects— a vector thus far eschewed in 
scholarly analysis and with import beyond academia. If memory at regional level is 
indeed an active ingredient1 in conflict dynamics (deployed by actors to either fuel or 
diffuse conflict)— whether in form of cross-border fractures and grievance, or 
conversely ‘itinerant nationalisms,’ ideologies and narratives of social cohesion— this 
creates tensions and important questions vis-à-vis conflict resolution. In what follows, 
I argue and demonstrate that even in complex conflicts spanning borders, conflict 
resolution approaches remain fundamentally focused on events and grievances that 
occurred within a given nation-state and are unequipped to deal with regional 
dimensions of memory, which nonetheless, I argue, exert powerful impact on 
prospects for peace.  
 
The paper sets its investigation in the context of arguably one of the most complex 
and geographically layered conflicts of recent decades. As such, the Great Lakes 
Region is a key case study, pushing us to think in more imaginative and complex 
ways about memory. The violent crises in the Great Lakes have been cyclical and 
interconnected. Rwanda and Burundi have been characterized by bouts of ethnic 
                                                        
1 This is not to mean that memory is an independent agent and exerting autonomous force. 
Memory is socially constructed. What the paper argues is simply that memory, when in the hands 
of key actors who indeed have the power to shape it, is a key ingredient in conflict dynamics, 
both in the ways in which it can fuel grievance, and in attempts at diffusion of conflict.   
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violence ever since independence that culminated in the 1994 Rwandan genocide and 
spilled across the borders via vast refugee flows. The genocide in turn acted as a 
catalyst of one of the most complex wars on the African continent. The violent 
confrontations that took place on the territory of the DRC between 1997 and 2003, 
and the violence that lingers to this day, have involved no less than eight neighboring 
African nations and a multiplicity of local armed groups (Prunier 2009, Lemarchand 
2009, Verhoeven and Roessler 2016). But the conflict in Central Africa is not only 
very much regionally constituted in terms of actual geographical spread, it is also 
where regional history and collective memories are deployed and contested, they 
become protagonists to conflict itself and continue to be axes of dispute and tension in 
so-called ‘post-conflict’ commemoration and peace-building practice as well.  
 
While the centrality of historical memory– particularly the uses and abuses of stories 
of origin— have been acknowledged through seminal works such as those of Jan 
Vansina (2004) on Rwanda and René Lemarchand (1996) on Burundi, few scholars 
have attempted to glance the problematique through squarely regional lens and have 
instead studied what they called political ‘myths’ (Lemarchand 1999), the uses of 
stories of origin to political ends and at times violent attempts at exclusionary nation-
building within particular national contexts. Mahmood Mamdani (2002) remains one 
of the few scholars who has intimated a more regional constitution of conflict-
contributing memory in the Great Lakes in his essay ‘African States, Citizenship and 
War,’ Mamdani shows how a particular, exclusionary form of citizenship, a legacy of 
colonialism, has been replicated across Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC, producing a 
cycle of displacement, conflict and challenges to peace building. A particular form of 
non-democratic citizenship is indeed still being reproduced across the region and fuels 
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conflict and constraints nation-building in its aftermath. Importantly, memory shared 
across borders mediates this dynamic. Thus our limits on imagining memory in its 
regional dimensions acts to hinder our attempts at conflict transformation as well.  
 
But memory at regional level is not only about social fracture as more commonly 
understood, it can also refer to the transnational dimensions of nationalism. Hence we 
must seriously investigate the degree to which memories spanning borders have the 
potential to be both conflict producing and conflict diffusing. Scholars have begun 
exploring nationalist groups and movements based across borders and inspired 
through their exilic experience. Scholarship on national liberation movements in 
southern Africa has begun to explore the fundamentally ‘transnational’ operation of 
‘nationalist’ movements, which were firmly embedded in the region and mobile 
across borders (see Hayes 2014, MacMillan 2013, Terretta 2010, White and Larmer 
2014). This has certainly been the case for the second wave of liberation movements 
as well, as the case of the Rwanda Patriotic Front shows.  
 
Most recently, Larmer and Kennes (2016) have traced the fascinating history of the 
Katangese gendarmes, the short-lived army of a self-declared Katanga state in the 
southern reaches of the Congo (today DRC) whose members have dispersed across 
the region after the secession failed, having been mobilized and demobilized in 
regional conflicts, incursions into the Congo, and later the integrated DRC army. The 
authors argue that it was a common project of imagining a homeland, resuscitating 
memories of secession that provided an identity over time to ex-militaries spread 
beyond the borders of the DRC. Understanding this group ‘necessitates a dynamic, 
mobile historical analysis, following the gendarmes across borders’ (2016:2). 
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Similarly, the RPF nationalism studied here was born in exile, across a number of 
countries in the region, and later ‘repatriated’ home through a military invasion and 
capture of power. 
 
The present paper contributes to and extends these debates by exploring the nexus 
between memory and conflict, the actual mechanisms through which memory in its 
regional dimension impinges on post-war social cohesion and the prospects for 
durable peace. In this respect, the paper shows that complex conflicts spin diverse 
‘regimes of memory’—different ways in which memory impacts conflict. Region-
based memory can be used to fuel conflict or, as will be shown, it can be deployed in 
nation-building, seemingly opposed projects as far as social cohesion is concerned. I 
call these two regimes ‘contestatory’ and ‘consolidatory’ – the former referring to 
what unravels society (memories fuelling continued grievances), the latter to what is 
meant to restore social cohesion (memory deployed in nation-building). The distinct 
contribution of this paper is its focus on the little-studied mobile diasporic memory— 
memory born in regional exile transplanted ‘home’ to nation-build— and on 
analyzing the two contrasting regimes of memory alongside each other with the 
following core question in mind: What is the relationship between regional strands of 
memory and social cohesion, and can our very ‘imagining regionally’ help us better 
tailor our conflict transformation initiatives? 
 
This duality of region-based memory— that it has defined and been defined by social 
fracture, and it has also been deployed, perhaps paradoxically, in post-conflict 
attempts at nation building—  derives from the productive ambiguity that lies at the 
root of the concept. Are region-wide memories the shared meanings/representations 
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across the span of a region? Or can they even exist in one locality upon which people 
from across a region coalesce and where they deploy their diasporic recollections to a 
common purpose, or say where, without moving, people deploy regionally 
constructed frameworks of analysis of their national predicaments?  In this paper, I 
explore both aspects since I don’t take the physical location as primary to our 
definition but rather the community of experience, whether real or imagined. The 
paper thus analyses memory both as the shared networks of meaning across national 
boundaries and the ways in which people who were dispersed across a region come 
together to, paradoxically, craft a nationalist memory by deploying a distinctly 
regional one. This latter aspect builds on my long-term research on the politics of 
nation building in Rwanda.  
 
The above has implications vis-à-vis the broader conception of a region. There are 
different ways to conceptualize it. One way to proceed is through a pre-definition of 
region as a collection of contiguous territorial units, whether nation-states, 
municipalities or groups of people. But this approach is unwieldy as it might not 
encompass the phenomenon at hand. The second option is to define regions more 
organically and dynamically as networks of interaction, whether exchange, action, 
influence or impact. In this second conception, regions are not pre-defined 
geographically but geographies self-define through the events and interactions that tie 
areas together. This opens up all sorts of interesting ways to think of region-based 
memory and its ‘mobility.’ In this conception, both region and memory become 
expandable, and they can also be carried – as in literally where the regional diaspora 
returns home and deploys memory and memory building in their post-war 
reconstruction. The case of Rwanda demonstrates this most clearly. The refugee 
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communities produced through violence rooted in divisive memory traded across 
borders consolidated an ostensibly alternative, ‘unifying’ nationalism, and repatriated 
it home. 
 
A key, overarching concern of the paper is of course to consider whether these two 
regional regimes – the fracturing versus the unification—do indeed, in the final 
analysis, show us very different deployments of memory. Does one indeed fuel 
conflict whereas the latter promotes peace? In other words, what are their actual 
impacts on peace building in the region? The answer might be more paradoxical than 
expected. While paying attention to the contestations over region-based memory can 
remind us that much more work is still necessary when it comes to peace building and 
channel our attention in productive ways, being lulled by the consolidatory regime 
might merely obscure the fractures— local, national and regional in scope— that such 
new, regionally-sourced nationalist memory merely obscures.  
 
In what follows, I first draw out the key ways in which memory and conflict have 
been interacting in the Great Lakes Region historically.2 Rather than simply providing 
a useful historical backdrop to later empirical sections, the section re-interprets 
historical material through the lens of region-based memory as an active variable in 
conflict dynamics, proposing three key ways in which memory and conflict have 
interacted over time. The empirical sections follow and trace the ways in which 
region-wide memory can be deployed to fuel or to diffuse conflict. This duality will 
be specifically explored on the case of the Rwandan genocide and its legacy. The 
paper will demonstrate the way in which genocide within a single state came to 
                                                        
2 For clarity, an area which here comprises Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo and 
Uganda. 
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produce a geographically much broader memory fracture – a contested and 
antagonistic narrative dividing people regionally— and conversely, how region-
spanning memory of a Rwandan diaspora came to inform nation building in the post-
genocide state. Each empirical section closes with an exploration of how region-based 
memory squares up with dominant approaches to peace building. The paper draws on 
extensive field research in Central Africa, mostly qualitative in nature, drawing on 
over two hundred interviews, documentary sources, in addition to ethnographic 
observation, carried out principally in Rwanda and Burundi between 2008 and 2015. 
 
The Great Lakes Region: Tracing the Historical Consolidation of Cross-Border 
Memory Regimes 
 
In which ways do conflict and memory intersect on a regional level? The intricacies 
of a concrete case demonstrate at least three ways in which this happens: First, the 
regional circulation of divisive historical narratives can directly contribute to 
violence. Second, a reductive framing of national crises against dynamics elsewhere 
in the region can contribute to polarization of communities and escalation of domestic 
crises. Finally, the formation of diasporic memory resulting from conflict-induced 
migrations can results in new nationalist visions and alternative historical narratives 
that aim to be inclusive, to unify rather than divide. 
 
Importantly, it is not simply the violent conflict itself that spins memory across a 
region but its very roots lie in region-based memory. Specifically, the underlying 
cause is the exclusionary nature of citizenship rooted in ethnonationalist imaginings 
of belonging, traceable to colonial racist representations and practices in the region, 
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including in Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC, all of which were under Belgian colonial 
rule. Though colonial rule is more often remembered for creating ‘artificial’ borders 
and importing the nation-state form, it is colonial rule that in fact first laid the 
groundwork for regionalization of memory. Ready-made racialized interpretive grids 
imported by the colonialists were adapted to local circumstances and became 
ultimately instrumentalized from below. They entered a local repertoire of myths 
(Lemarchand 1999, Jackson 2006) and offered a way of interpreting local dynamics in 
much broader terms. 
 
The so-called ‘Hamitic hypothesis’ lies at the core of such regionalism. The 
colonialists racialized social differences and vested racial supremacy and power in the 
hands of one group, incidentally the minority in both Burundi and Rwanda– the Tutsi. 
The predominantly pastoralist Tutsi were considered superior as so-called Hamites, 
allegedly a branch of the Caucasian race (see Taylor 1999, Mamdani 2001, Stanton 
2004, Eltringham 2006). The Hamitic hypothesis was politically instrumentalized not 
only during colonialism when it concentrated power and control into the hands of a 
minority, but after independence as well. When the Hutu majority took power in 
Rwanda in 1959, the Hamitic hypothesis was deployed to political effect yet gain, but 
this time not to extol but rather to condemn the minority. The Rwandan elites used it 
to highlight the ‘extraneous provenance’ of the Tutsi, painting them as ‘invaders who 
have stolen our country’ (Eltringham 2006). During the 1990-1994 civil war in 
Rwanda, the invading Tutsi refugees were portrayed as foreigners set on recapturing 
power and re-establishing an oppressive monarchy. These images and exclusionary 
rhetoric were used to justify the 1994 genocide. The Hamitic hypothesis was also 
operative and politically deployed in neighboring Burundi. 
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Such distorted narratives found their more potent regional version in another myth, 
that of the ‘Hima-Tutsi empire,’ a narrative that has also expanded well beyond 
Rwanda and Burundi to the DRC, Uganda and beyond. Rwanda’s and Uganda’s more 
recent military involvement and influence in the DRC has helped to resuscitate and 
consolidate this narrative of an ‘outsider’ minority set on creating and expanding an 
‘empire’ in the region – again referencing the minority ethnic status of the elites in 
power in Rwanda since 1994, in Burundi until 2003, in Uganda since 1986, and of the 
rebel groups they support in the DRC. The local Congolese self-defence groups 
(known as Mai Mai) reproduce this rhetoric: ‘The [Tutsi] ambition to create an empire 
here in Central Africa is the cause of our suffering’ (quoted in Hoffman 2006: 6). 
‘There is a sincere concern amongst the Mai Mai that the RCD rebellion [believed to 
be directed by Rwanda and Uganda] was indeed an attempt to annex the Kivus and 
parts of Maniema into a Tutsi-Hima empire and that this would imply the systematic 
elimination a large part of the autochtonous population’ (ibid: 6). Importantly, it is 
‘experienced as not only an aggression against the Congo but against all Bantus of 
Central Africa’ (ibid). 
 
However distorted these narratives, they have strong regional presence and have had 
real impact on the ground. ‘It is amazing to what extent the ethnic stereotypes and 
conflicts that were born in Rwanda contaminated the rest of the region,’ writes 
Stearns (2011), ‘No other image plagues the Congolese imagination as much as that 
of the Tutsi aggressor. No other sentiment has justified as much violence in the Congo 
as anti-Tutsi ideology. Again and again, in the various waves of conflict in the Congo, 
the Tutsi community has taken centre stage, as victims and killers. This antagonism is 
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fueled by struggles over land tenure, citizenship, and access to resources, but also and 
most directly by popular prejudice and a vicious circle of revenge.’ (Stearns 2011:79). 
 
The narratives above directly formed the politics of exclusion witnessed in the region. 
The nationalisms that formed in the post-independence period either excluded the 
majority (i.e. Burundi’s Tutsi ethnocracy until the 1990s, Rwanda post-genocide) or 
they excluded the minority(ies) (i.e. Rwanda’s 1st and 2nd Republics, Zaire under 
Mobutu). While in Rwanda the Hutu majority took power in 1959 to the 
discrimination and exclusion of the Tutsi minority, in Burundi conversely the Tutsi 
minority held on to power for decades after independence, to the political exclusion 
and even violent suppression of the majority Hutu. In the DRC, a complex interplay 
of inclusion and exclusion also developed and saw the consolidation of the 
autochtony (indigeneity) versus allogenité (outsider status) discourses. Long-
established groups of Kinyarwanda and Kirundi speakers (particularly the 
Banyamulenge in South Kivu and Banyamasisi in North Kivu) were excluded from 
full belonging on account of their immigrant status.v In all of these cases, the nation 
was read along narrow lines, with powerful exclusions of segments of the social body 
from the full membership and access to power, economy and even moral community. 
 
Besides toxic regional narratives of origin and belonging, a related regional dynamic 
was at play and namely the framing of the political situation at home against 
situations elsewhere in the region. Such ‘vicarious remembrance’ involved the 
reading one’s own predicament through past and present (violent) events across the 
border. For most of their post-colonial history, Burundi and Rwanda were seemingly 
symmetrical opposites of each other— while Rwanda was dominated by the majority 
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Hutu (first southern Hutu, then northern Hutu), Burundi was ruled by the minority 
Tutsi (specifically the Banyabururi elites). The two countries were not of course exact 
inversions of each other, with Burundi’s social diversity more complex and less 
ethnicised at independence (Lemarchand 1996), but what matters is that people read 
history across the border as inspiration and omen of what could come. As a result of 
this framing, the events in Rwanda, especially the Hutu seizure of power in the 1959 
‘social revolution’ both inspired the masses in Burundi and confirmed the worst fears 
of the Burundian elite. This ‘mirror image dynamics’ continued and created a unique 
form of regionalization of national crises.  
 
In effect, through vicarious remembrance Burundi’s political elites took a ‘false 
definition’ of the social problem upon themselves – reading their own predicament in 
line with Rwanda, whose social composition was similar and yet not identical and less 
complex.3 Nonetheless, as Lemarchand (1996) argues, this gradually turned into a 
self-fulfilling prophecy: ‘The Rwanda revolution of 1959, for one thing, had a 
decisive psychological impact on ethnic self-perceptions in Burundi. The coming to 
power of Hutu politicians in Rwanda led to many of their kinsmen in Burundi to share 
their political objectives, in turn intensifying fears of ethnic domination among the 
Tutsi of Burundi. Thus by giving the Burundi situation a false definition to start with, 
a definition patterned on the Rwandan situation, Hutu politicians evoked a new 
behavior both among themselves and the Tutsi which made their originally false 
imputations true. Ethnic conflict thus took on the quality of a ‘self-fulfilling 
prophecy.’’ 
 
                                                        
3 In Burundi, there was a separate Ganwa princely class, and the Tutsi divided into Hima and 
Banyaruguru. 
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In a sense, Burundi today still faces the ‘false definition to start with’ by being 
constantly compared to its neighbor Rwanda. The ongoing 2015 electoral crisis and 
the violence and repression it produced are being read against the Rwandan genocide 
of 1994 with media accounts highlighting both its ethnic character and its potential to 
turn to genocide. Countless media reports engage in this sort of mischaracterization,vi 
albeit indirectly, insinuating possibilities rather than stating them directly (for an in-
depth discussion see Purdeková 2017b). Often, media releases end with statements 
such as: ‘Burundi neighbors Rwanda and has a similar ethnic make-up to the country 
whose genocide in 1994 still casts long shadows of shame and fear.’vii  
 
Phrases such as this are meant to unlock for the foreign reader the nature of the 
conflict and the nature of possible escalation. But while politics of exclusion still lies 
at the root of the most recent crisis (specifically, the democratic rollback evidenced in 
the incumbent’s disdain for presidential term limits and the increasingly authoritarian 
rule by the dominant party) to read the violence first and foremost through the 
neighbor’s past and through the ethnic lens is problematic. When considered closely, 
the violence falls across political partisan lines rather than ethnic lines, pitting the 
government against its opposition. In a sense though, the media misrepresentation 
demonstrates quite effectively the continued power of particular conflict frames, and 
their regional scope.  
 
Importantly, it was not only Burundi watching Rwanda, being defined and self-
defined through its neighbor, but vice versa as well. The killing of a first 
democratically elected Hutu president in Burundi in 1993, for example, significantly 
contributed to the consolidation of extremist, anti-Tutsi forces in Rwanda. These 
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examples show us a unique regional symmetry of violence that has developed in the 
Great Lakes mediated through vicarious remembrance.  
 
In addition to regionalized colonial myths and self-fulfilling prophecies, there is also 
the more mundane fact of regional migration that set the context for a regional extent 
of both war and conflicted memory of it. In other words, conflict and migration 
contributed to the formation of a diasporic memory spanning borders. Through waves 
of migration both forced and assisted, Kinyarwanda speakers, both Hutu and Tutsi, 
have come to inhabit a number of countries in the region, including Rwanda, Burundi, 
DRC, Uganda and Tanzania. ‘Since the 1960s Rwandese, Congolese and Burundian 
refugee households have been dispersed across East and Central Africa’ (Daley 
2013:907). This resulted in ‘a reality of transnationalism in the region’ (ibid). 
 
Tutsi refugees from Rwanda from 1959 onwards deserve closer attention, particularly 
those settled in neighboring Uganda. The Rwandan refugee communities in Uganda 
felt powerfully their exclusion from citizenship, despite or precisely because they 
were fighting with the Ugandan National Resistance Movement (NRM) and helped it 
to successfully seize power in 1986. Despite this ‘ultimate sacrifice’ for another 
country, the Banyarwanda refugees were not granted citizenship in Uganda. Rwanda, 
on the other hand, was not allowing them to come back. This double exclusion 
prepared the ground for a militarized repatriation. 
 
Decades of exclusion in their host countries led to the establishment among the Tutsi 
refugees in Uganda of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) and to ‘mass mobilization’ 
among all displaced Rwandans in the diaspora. The RPF cadres across the region 
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actively kindled memories of home and the past. In essence, this was a regionally 
embedded nationalist reconstruction, later literally ‘repatriated’ home. In 1990, the 
RPF invaded Rwanda, sparking a four-year civil war, which culminated in the 1994 
genocide perpetrated by the embattled and increasingly extremist government against 
the Tutsi population. The RPF finally captured power in July 1994 becoming the 
dominant political force in the country. The movement-turned-party continued to 
tighten its grip on domestic political space over time and came to define the contours 
of post-genocide reconstruction and nation-building.  
 
As we can already see, layers of exclusion were reproduced over time. But the story 
of conflict does not end here. RPF’s takeover of power saw massive outmigration, 
now of Rwandan Hutu populations into the DRC, Tanzania, Burundi and beyond, and 
the concomitant spread of the conflict, into the DRC especially. The refugee camps in 
the DRC became de-facto states and bases for the fleeing genocidaires. The logic of 
the genocide was likewise spread into the territory of Eastern DRC, where the 
remnants of extremist militias were targeting all Tutsi Kinyarwanda speakers in the 
region. Violence and its logics were thus spread and regionalized in the most literal 
sense.  
 
Citing security concerns, in 1996 the new RPF-led government in Kigali decided to 
dismantle the DRC camps forcibly and to force repatriations from them back to 
Rwanda. Those unwilling to return were pursued across the DRC, with a terrible 
human cost (see Prunier 2009). The inability of the Rwanda forces to neutralize the 
remnants of the former genocidal militias created a permanent Rwandan presence in 
the DRC, which in turn drew hostility from local populations. The toxic historical 
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narratives discussed above were once again resuscitated and ‘outsiders,’ ‘Rwandans’ 
blamed by local populations for the continued insecurity in their country. Stability in 
Rwanda in late 1990s and onwards has thus been married to continued instability in 
the neighboring region, where Rwandaphones and Rwandan forces become central 
protagonists in the crisis and are so to this day. 
 
In sum, waves of migration out of partial, exclusionary nationalisms have come to 
constitute a region-wide conflict and region-wide memory. The conflict cycle hasn’t 
been broken to this day and, as I will show, memory is implicated. I will attempt to do 
this in two ways, by asking: First, has the regional nature of contested narratives been 
acknowledged? And second, has a new regionally sourced nationalism produced a 
more inclusionary form of citizenship? In answering these questions, I will zoom in 
on the legacies of the Rwandan genocide. I will first look at the way in which the 
genocide and its outfall created a contested memory beyond the borders of that single 
nation-state, why this matters and whether this has been acknowledged post-conflict. 
Second, I will look at how regional diasporic memory has been deployed by the 
returning diaspora in Rwanda for the purposes of nation building and reconciliation 
after the genocide. 
 
A Memory Regime of Contestation: Conflicted Memories and Silenced Memory 
in the Region 
 
First, let us explore memory as a regime of region-wide contestation. The 1994 
Rwandan genocide, the civil war that led to it and the regional war that was spawned 
as its result, have created a fractured memory regime, layers of region-wide memory 
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that lie in tension and produce contestations. The fracture expands beyond the borders 
of Rwanda and is at its core the result of a very partial acknowledgment of 
victimhood and partial remembrance. Together these are a potent show of the 
lingering meta-conflict— conflict over the meaning of conflict— in the Great Lakes 
Region of Africa.  
 
There are concretely two fracturing elements: First, the wider regional predicament 
has not been officially acknowledged, and namely that both the genocide crimes and 
the crimes perpetrated by the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF)viii extend beyond 
Rwanda. Second, the Hutu and Twa victims of the RPF war, and later the RPF-led 
government’s incursions into the DRC are completely suppressed in public memory 
(see Zorbas 2004). While the Tutsi and a small number of elite Hutu victims of 
genocide inhabit a zone of rememberance, the Hutu victims of RPF crimes bear a 
difficult and politically imposed silence. In other words, public memory of violence is 
nation-state framed and partial, remembering only certain aspects of violence.  
 
The suppressed memory and counter-memory of course have layers. There are those 
who do not deny the genocide but highlight crimes that were committed alongside it. 
There also more extreme narratives still circulating across the region, some 
denying/negating genocide (guhakana) and others diminishing/trivializing (gupfobya) 
the crime of genocide. These latter narratives add fuel to the Rwandan government’s 
political repression, offering a ready-made frame for attacking all those who oppose 
the political establishment rather than simply those who threaten the safety of the 
population. Abahakana – the deniers of genocide, and the abakwirakwiza – those who 
spread genocide ideology, have become potent political labels. But ‘genocide 
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ideology’ (ingengabitekerezo ya jenoside) is not only a key domestic concern-cum-
tool of the government, it has ‘spread’ (Rusagara 2012) across the region, adding fuel 
to Rwanda’s interventionism outside its borders. 
 
Fractures exist on another level yet, this time not resulting from the genocide-related 
violence but rather Rwandan interventionism in the region following the genocide. 
After their flight to the DRC, the genocidal government and the remnants of the 
interahamwe militias remained active, launching incursions into Rwanda, 
intimidating the refugees, and targeting local populations. The ‘security issues’ has 
triggered long-standing interventionism from Rwanda (and aided by Uganda and 
Burundi) in the Congo. The presence of Rwandan troops on Congolese soil and their 
support to a string of local militias was initially denied in Kigali but is well 
documented today. Rwanda helped sponsor, train and man local militias mostly drawn 
from the ethnically Tutsi groups in the Eastern DRC, first helping to put together the 
AFDL, then the RDC, followed by the CNDP and finally the M23.  
 
The foreign meddling and resulting insecurity have turned local communities against 
both Rwanda and Kinyarwanda-speakers in the DRC, and increasingly so over time 
(see Mathys 2017). We could argue post-genocide Rwandan interventionism has led 
to increased polarization and profiling of memory. While the Tutsi in the region, in 
Rwanda and the DRC, see the possibility of annihilation and see interventionism as 
legitimate self-defence, opponents see this as an invasion, imputing expansionary 
motives to the Tutsi as a group. They deploy tropes of rightful belonging and 
autochtony on the one hand, versus allogenité and outsider status of the Tutsi on the 
other (as ‘newcomers,’ immigrants, outsiders), resuscitating once again myths that 
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took root during colonialism and that have been deployed to violent ends after 
independence (see Verweijen 2015, Boas and Dunn 2014; Jackson 2006; Mathys 
2017).  
 
Let me return to a question I asked at the beginning: If memory of conflict is regional, 
what are then the repercussions for dealing with such past through resolution regimes 
(transitional justice, reconciliation, unity building) that operate within the bounds of 
the nation-state? The above analysis demonstrates that in places like the Great Lakes 
Region of Africa, reconciling opposed memories needs to be a regional endeavor. A 
number of factors still preclude this, however. Besides the practical difficulties in 
operationalizing a regional approach, there are important political challenges, which 
include the narrowly-constituted and undemocratic nature of political regimes in the 
region and the political motivations of elites in power to suppress aspects of memory, 
in Rwanda, Burundi, DRC and beyond.  
 
It must be noted that what we call for here is distinct from ‘regional peace building 
approaches’ (van Leeuwen 2008) as these have been promoted on the ground. The 
International Conference on the Great Lakes (ICGL), operative since 2000, is 
composed of states and operates at a very figurative, diplomatic level, being subject to 
all the tensions and inter-state conflicts of interests we witness in the region. The 
ICGL attempts at resolution do not cut deep enough to shared grievances and 
imaginaries. But even regional civil society peace building efforts have faced 
challenges. As van Leeuwen has observed, ‘local and international organizations have 
difficulty in analyzing the regional character of conflict and arriving at collaborative 
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regional strategies,’ and they are ‘deeply embedded in the politics of regional 
conflict.’  
 
A strategy recognizing regional dimensions of memory thus must be built on a 
different foundation. It cannot be simply summative, adding separate national actors 
together, whether at state level or locally. The framework and the institution 
supporting it must be regional from the outset, based in a neutral setting and sourcing 
staff based on its regional vision and purpose; it must document, analyze and structure 
action through a regional lens, rather than the standard run through a set of national or 
even local scenarios. The aim of such institution must be the search for 
interconnections across boundaries, and the ways in which these have and continue to 
create impacts at different scales.  Again, such approach is unique and missing; it is 
different from universalized approaches anchored in human rights, different from 
calls to ‘hybridize’ transitional justice by applying it to local contexts, and different 
yet from research frames such those of the International Crisis Group (ICG) that again 
tend to focus on particular countries.  
 
Official commemoration of the Rwandan genocide shows these challenges well. The 
practice on the ground is not only i) confined to the territory of Rwanda; but ii) even 
within the country, it is partial, denying certain types of victimhood and certain layers 
of memory that span the region. The meta-conflict in many senses continues through 
the practices of commemoration whereby the Hutu victims of violence are silenced, 
excluded from the narrative, completely left out of the transitional justice process (see 
Thomson 2013). Victims of national actors abroadix are also completely silenced and 
excluded from the new memory being forged.  
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The Rwandan annual commemoration Kwibuka (Remember) has become a truly 
global enterprise. During the early days of April, the embassies and ‘friends of 
Rwanda’ come together, organize events, and as such truly ‘co-remember’ the 
genocide of the Tutsi. Didactic memorials such as those in Nyamata and Ntarama dot 
the Rwandan landscape, filled with neatly arranged remains of the victims. 
Commemoration activities fill the year. In these performances and spaces, the past is 
both actively remembered and actively suppressed at once. The Hutu victims of RPF 
crimes across the region are not spoken about. Those who dare to publically mention 
them can end up in jail. But in private of course, people do speak of and acknowledge 
the Hutu victims. The sites of violence and shallow graves are etched in memory if 
not in the landscape.  
 
In Burundi, it is not victor’s justice but rather a public silence on the past that 
prevails. While local communities and organizations have organized reconciliation 
and commemoration initiatives with different degrees of success (see e.g. Purdeková 
2017a), at the national level there is a political stall in pushing a meaningful TJ 
process forward (Vandeginste 2012). This is due to what is known as an ‘alliance of 
impunity:’ All key political actors in the power-sharing government have participated 
in violence and have thus incentives to frustrate the process of justice.  In the DRC, as 
discussed, the conflict as well as the metaconflict are still very much under way and 
little has been done by way of transitional justice. Overall then, what we witness in 
the region is fragmented memory. Fractures run not only along the broad lines and 
divides of the conflict whereby the victor can claim the narrative and political space 
alike, (re) producing grievances through the suppression of strains of memory. 
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Fractures also run along separate nation-state lines, whereby each government 
reframes region-wide memory in accordance with the domestic constellation of 
political interest and incentive. But even in cases of memory suppression or simply 
lack of action on the past such as in post-war Burundi, people at the local level have 
been countering forces of oblivion and erasure of memory with different degrees of 
involvement and success (see Purdeková 2017a). But they have been acting in very 
localized arenas – thinking and acting regionally, as in connecting the margins across 
borders, might thus be a productive step forward. 
 
What does this suggest? It suggests we the need to reach deeper beyond analysis and 
commemoration of specific nationally-bound events such as the Burundi genocide of 
1972 or the Rwanda genocide of 1994. Such delimitations, while not incorrect, 
enclose us too much in the national space, precluding us from seeing the wider scope 
of the conflict. They preclude us from discussions about the distinctly regional roots 
of cyclical and long-term political crises in the region; from paying attention to potent 
narratives and myths that have taken shape and form across the region, and the nature 
of nationalism that these have given rise to. Roots and outcomes are interconnected. 
Representations of the past rooted in exclusionary narratives of belonging translate 
into the physical realm – constituting violence and forced migration – which then turn 
to the representational realm once again – shaping the ways in which these practices 
are remembered and the types of nationalisms that are envisioned. While in this 
section we have considered remembrance, the next section considers the nature of 
post-genocide nation-building and whether the sort of regionally-constituted 
nationalism we witness in Rwanda does indeed (as it claims to) reverse the 
exclusionary forms of belonging of the past. 
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A Memory Regime of Consolidation: Regionalism in the Service of Nation-
Building 
 
In this second section, I would like to explore the notion of diasporic memory as a 
regime of consolidation rather than contestation, focusing on the ways in which 
memory born in exile has been deployed (whether successfully or not) to build social 
cohesion. The case of post-genocide Rwanda again offers a good example. Nation-
building here draws on diasporic memory, on transnational experience of exile, on 
lives and pasts elsewhere, on region-wide memory converging upon the national 
space, physical and representational.  
 
Rwanda is a unique case in that the new post-genocide elite in Rwanda hails from 
exile. Most of those who hold power in today’s Rwanda hail from Paul Kagame’s 
Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) formed in exile in Uganda, mobilizing across the 
diaspora, later capturing power and now dominating the domestic political space. 
Much of the elite is thus composed by former refugees, mostly of the Tutsi minority 
and mostly refugees from Uganda where the RPF originated. Many key figures in the 
government have grown up in neighboring countries, some of them entered Rwanda 
for the first time after the genocide. It is them who became and continue to be the elite 
responsible for reconstruction after the war and for defining the nature of post-
genocide nation building (see Purdeková 2015). 
 25 
 
The ‘consolidations’ aspect of this paper’s argument then refers to the involvement of 
memory in promoting a ‘social whole,’ specifically its involvement in the way in 
which the new Rwanda or Rwandanness is imagined within Rwanda after the 
genocide. Against the toxic narratives of division and origin that fuelled the violence 
in the region since the end of colonialism, the RPF has consolidated a new official 
nationalist narrative in exile, one that de-emphasizes ethnicity and highlights and aims 
to build a common ‘Rwandanness’ (Ubunyarwanda). In fact, in post-genocide 
Rwanda, the mention of ethnicity has been forbidden (see Purdeková 2008, 
Eltringham 2011). 
 
The story of a repatriated nationalism is a fascinating next chapter to Liisa Malkki’s 
explorations of the constructions of historicity, subjectivity and national 
consciousness among encamped refugees in exile. In her seminal book Purity and 
Exile Malkki detailed the ways in which Hutu refugees fleeing the 1972 genocide in 
Burundi became politicized and weaved very strong ethnonationalist narratives in 
Tanzanian refugee camps. Interestingly, their nationalism had a locus in the region, it 
arose after the crossing of boundaries. What we have in Rwanda after the genocide is 
both a flipside and the next chapter of this process: Former refugees capture political 
space at ‘home’ through armed repatriation and are in a position to define the nature 
of inclusion, the new narrative of the nation, drawing in the process on their exile 
experiences. Diasporic experiences replanted home thus now shape a new form of 
nation building.  
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But what are some of the concrete ways in which regionally-anchored memory is 
involved? For one, the diasporic elite has been drawing on their experiences in exile 
in crafting special nation building technologies. The successful mobilization strategies 
of refugee political organizations in the 1980s strongly shaped their approach after 
capture of power in Kigali. The reinventions of tradition after the genocide— the 
explosion of ‘neo-traditionality’ in modern Rwanda in forms of development and 
reconciliation activities allegedly inspired in pre-colonial practice (see Purdeková 
2015)— and more specifically yet, the uses of the technology of the camp for political 
and national education are all inspired by and crafted on the basis of experiences in 
the diaspora. One of my interviewees vividly evoked the clandestine meetings mixing 
cultural awareness and political education for the Banyarwanda refugees. The exile-
born RPF was ‘mobilizing members from all over, meet for a month, they could take 
a home from someone, even in Kampala, and meet there, so that the security and 
police would not know, there were many strategies, just a family “visit,” there were 
strict communication rules, but this was just political and cultural, not military, the 
noise could attract some curiosity.’x These clandestine ‘schools’ thus mixed the 
raising of cultural awareness (‘to remember Rwanda’xi in exile) with the political 
purpose of political mobilization (‘to bring the people together to share the ideals of 
the RPF’xii). 
 
The returnee elite in Rwanda has been drawing on such regional practices of political 
education, which they have modified to serve the needs of the post-genocide political 
project. ‘it started with the RPF [in exile] and then was adopted by others [inside 
Rwanda]. The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission used this instrument 
for all people [Rwandans, after the genocide].’xiii Post-genocide ingando ‘civic 
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education’ retreats in remote camps are hailed as the cornerstone of the nation-
building project and are the flagship activity of the National Unity and Reconciliation 
Commission (NURC). In interviews, the returnees often tie Rwanda’s new ingando 
and itorero camps to precedents elsewhere in the diaspora, the RPF clandestine 
classes in exile organized to raise political and cultural awareness among the diaspora 
(described above), but also other precedents, especially the Chaka Mchaka courses in 
neighboring Uganda that bear the closest parallel,  and Tanzania’s JKT (Jesh Kugenda 
Taifa) courses combining military training, social service and nation-building. 
 
And it is paradoxically in these encamped spaces, constituted through memory and 
experience of regional exile that a distinctly new, nationalist history is being 
inculcated and impressed upon the participants since shortly after the genocide. The 
ingando and itorero camps both reflect and promote militaristic culture and values of 
the exile guerilla movement (‘They want [us] to go through what the soldiers went 
through, the food, the training, this is what the RPF soldiers used to eat.’xiv) and 
reproduce a national vision of a de-ethnicised Rwanda first elaborated and reproduced 
across diasporic communities through clandestine political schools. Hundreds of 
thousands of Rwandans of all walks of life have already passed through such intense 
courses. 
 
But the fascinating story of a ‘regionally-constituted nationalism’ does not end here. 
Rwanda’s repatriated nation building has later been again re-exported to the region. 
Through a set of proxy forces put together in Kigali, Rwanda has been directly 
involved not only in military operations and strategy of continuous ‘rebellions’ in 
Eastern Congo, but has tried to equally export its dominant vision of nation-building 
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inspired by military values—from strict boot camps ingando-style to emphasis on 
discipline, sacrifice for a broader goal and love for the nation. In a meeting with the 
proxy group RCD headed by Ernest Wamba dia Wamba and addressing the disarray, 
squabbles and low morale among the group’s members, Rwanda’s President ‘[Paul] 
Kagame took the floor. ‘Your problem is that you don’t love your country. You need 
to suffer; you are living the good life. When we were in our rebellion, we were so 
poor that we didn’t have plates to eat out of’’ (quoted in Stearns 2011). 
 
What type of nation-building is being created through civic education in camps such 
as ingando? Does it live up to its promise of countering the divisive 
ethnonationalisms that took root in the region in the past? Research in Rwanda 
suggests that regional experience does not necessarily translate into a more civic and 
inclusive notion of a nation (Purdeková 2008), one that would be inspired in the 
complex migration histories and identities and a hybrid sense of belonging. Instead, 
the accent is on restoring the glorious pre-colonial past, to resurrect ‘Rwandanicity’ as 
a cultural ideal, and to underscore loyalty and non-veering from the official line. The 
dominant nationalist narrative eschews diversity in the name of building common 
Rwandanness, but its strong emphasis on ‘unity’ merely papers over divisions that 
linger under the surface, the authoritarian nature of the government and its narrow 
base. The nation building project also interlaces with regime building: Regional 
historical memory is renarrated to serve a very politicized form of nation building, 
and the government crafts a type of citizenship that emphasizes loyalty to the state 
and the governing party (see Purdeková 2015). 
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The regional experience and memory then does not lead to an embrace of 
transnationalism, for example in commemoration of crimes against the Tutsi in the 
DRC or a more welcoming attitude to migrants and refugees. There is in fact an 
important historical parallel to this story on the African continent, bringing us back to 
a much earlier phase of nationalism during decolonization. The Southern national 
liberation movements (NLMs) in South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique 
were all fundamentally transnational. Exile and constant movement offered the NLMs 
not only the ability to mobilize militarily but also the ability to practice politically, to 
envision and enact politics and stateness. The nationalist movements were shaped by 
this experience in multiple ways. And yet, this past beyond national borders did not 
translate into more transnational or inclusive readings of nationalism upon victory and 
take-over of power at home. South Africa is a case in point, struggling with 
xenophobia, ‘othering’ of migrants and their exclusion. Similarly, in the Great Lakes 
Region, transnational pasts and regional memories have thus far not come to 
effectively challenge the exclusionary discourses and practices of citizenship and the 
nation-state as the dominant shaper and container of public memory on a painful past. 
 
 
Conclusions 
By way of conclusion, let me return to the core question of the paper: Is it useful to 
imagine memory, and not only conflict, regionally? The answer must be in the 
affirmative. Paying attention to imaginaries (whether grievances, differences or 
communality) shared within a bounded area but one that crosses national borders, is 
analytically productive in a number of ways at once. The post-colonial conflict in the 
Great Lakes of Africa set the ground for contested memory but also for diasporic 
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imaginary after the capture of power. Regionally applied imaginaries of belonging 
and exclusion have fostered violence and strewn people across borders. Such 
conflicted past has in turn produced both fractures and festering silences, and new 
imaginaries of belonging and nationness re-exported across boundaries. Such memory 
has thus fuelled both lingering social divisions and itinerant nationalisms. To take this 
duality into account, we can speak of different ‘regimes’ of region-wide memory in 
operation— such memory can aid state-making and nation-building, and it can be 
fundamentally fragmentary, undermining these projects because of the ongoing 
conflicts and the lack of full reconciliation on the past.  
 
As shown on the case of Rwanda, the same actors can in fact participate in both 
regimes. At the same time as the PRF actively pursues a regionally-sourced nation-
building seeped in its guerilla history of a truly transnational diasporic struggle, it also 
contributes to continued insecurity beyond its borders, which further polarizes 
communities across the region, producing a regional fracture. In the final reading, 
however, these two regimes are hardly opposed. The social cohesion being built in 
Rwanda through the elite’s nation-building attempts reproduces a dominant, top-down 
vision of unity that silences aspects of the past, reproduces partial victimhood and 
fosters sense of injustice as a result—social fracture by any other name. Hence though 
the two regimes are indeed distinct, their outcomes vis-à-vis peace-building might not 
be always dissimilar. 
 
 
There isn’t just one way to breach the topic of regional memory as there isn’t just one 
strand of memory to explore in any given geographical region. Here, I have shown on 
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the specific example of Rwanda how both the victims of genocide and the killings of 
the RPF reach beyond the borders of this country. In this case, the study of the two 
memory regimes unveils a paradox. Perhaps counter-intuitively, paying attention to 
layers of contestation can remind us that much more work is still necessary when it 
comes to peace building. It points us in the right direction and underlines our need to 
expand our understanding and action in line with this more expansive notion of 
memory. At the same time, and despite its appeals to nation-building, a restorative 
history, and multiplicity of activities of transitional justice, a consolidatory regime 
such as that in Rwanda – a new, regionally-sourced nationalist memory appealing to 
unity and setting itself in opposition to divisive ethnic narratives— might merely 
obscure the social fractures, local, national and regional in scope, that still persist.  
 
Importantly, the usefulness of ‘imagining regionally’ when it comes to memory 
extends beyond the realm of analysis. It does not only refine our understanding of 
memory and conflict, it also informs the practice of conflict resolution where it can 
expand the available repertoire of action. The paper highlighted the tension between 
the phenomenon under study –regional in scope- and the way in which it is acted 
upon. Peace-building and transitional justice cannot be fully successful if regional 
fractures such as partial victimhood and silenced violence are not recognized and 
acted upon as such. Peace-building and transitional justice attempts cannot be 
comprehensive if regional memory is fractured through different, and sometimes 
competing, national attempts to deal with its legacy and continued impact (i.e. 
integrationism and de-ethnicisation in Rwanda versus power-sharing and 
entrenchment of ethnicity in Burundi). As argued in the paper, and with relevance to 
other regional war complexes around the world, a regional frame does not equal the 
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summation of national actors, at whatever level, whether grassroots or state house. 
What does this imply in terms of practice? Practically speaking, a dedicated, 
independent body such as a commission of regional memory could be established to 
create a space necessary to supersede nationalist narratives of memory and memory 
initiatives bound by national boundaries. For example, rather than speaking of a 
Rwandan genocide as an event confined to the national territory of Rwanda, a 
regional memory body would re-narrate it as a phenomenon whose roots, extent and 
impact are regional.  
 
The role of the new regional memory architecture would be to explore and document 
regional extensions of memory, to suggest forms of resolution spanning borders, and 
to organize activities towards these ends. It would involve the establishment of 
regional archives and regional commemoration, amongst other things. This work 
would create two important contributions of both epistemic and practical value. First, 
such frame would finally give voice and recognition to migrants and refugees and 
place their experience more firmly at the center of historical events; it would 
underscore their predicaments as in need of recognition and redress. Second, such 
frame would be more firmly decolonial, and open opportunities for decolonial debates 
and action. If colonialism was key to laying the groundwork for some of the toxic 
narratives spanning the region, then only a truly regional frame is fit to address and 
redress this aspect of the past, and explore its legacies and continuities in the present. 
In sum then, the framework of regional memory has much to offer, and the present 
paper is merely a small first step towards exploring its full potential.  
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